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Abstract 
This paper focuses on an early Chinese conception of  genealogical argumentation in 
the late Warring States text Han Feizi and a possible response it has to the problem 
of  genealogical self-defeat as identified by Amia Srinivasan (2015)—i.e., the 
genealogist cannot seem to support their argument with premises their interlocutor 
or themselves can accept, given their own argument. The paper offers a reading of  
Han Fei’s genealogical method that traces back to the meditative practice of  an 
earlier Daoist text the Zhuangzi and its communicative strategy, offering a 
conception of  genealogy aimed at undoing fixations on political systems in order to 
bring about a more adaptive state—specifically genealogy that does not require 
epistemological commitment to its premises. 
Genealogy, as “a narrative that tries to explain a cultural phenomenon by describing a way in 
which it came about, or could have come about, or might be imagined to have come about,” has 
been receiving increasing attention in recent anglophone philosophy as a method of  
philosophical argumentation (Williams 2002, 20). Discussions have largely centred on 
‘subversive’ or ‘vindicatory’ conceptions, which explain a concept, belief, or judgment by 
appealing to, say, material or historical conditions to undermine or justify it, respectively 
(Srinivasan 2015, Lorenzini 2020): e.g., evolutionary debunking arguments that undermine moral 
realism by appealing to evolutionary facts (Street 2006), or state-of-nature arguments that justify 
testimonial justice by appealing to a minimal society’s necessary functionings (Fricker 2007). 
However, the binary focus on subversive and vindicatory genealogies occludes other important 
dimensions of  genealogical inquiry, like ‘possibilising,’ ‘problematising,’ and ‘world-making’ 
dimensions (e.g., Allen 2016, Srinivasan 2019, Lorenzini 2020). Moreover, these discussions 
overall have also tended to historicise themselves within an Anglo-European tradition, whose 
canonically founding figures include Nietzsche, and Foucault—and, to lesser extents, Hume and 
Herder (Williams 2002, Forster 2011, Koopman 2013, Queloz 2021). This paper is a 
contribution to the ongoing expansion of  anglophone conceptions of  genealogy, while also 
expanding beyond this canon: foregrounding an early Chinese instance from the Han Feizi. 
The Han Feizi is a Warring States text attributed to Legalist philosopher Han Fei, who directly 
influenced the First Emperor of  China. Against rival Confucians’ virtue politics, wherein rulers 
aspire to imitate the (moral) virtues of  the sage kings in statecraft, Han Fei recommends that 
rulers rely on state-bureaucratic mechanisms and techniques. Han Fei’s criticisms of  the 
Confucians still challenge Confucian philosophy today, as well as virtue ethics and politics more 
generally (e.g., Hutton 2008, Harris 2020, Huang 2022). And although replies have been made on 
behalf  of  Confucians (e.g., S. Kim 2012, Wilson 2018), I have argued elsewhere (2022) that these 
thus far do not avoid those criticisms that deploy subversive genealogical arguments (henceforth 
‘genealogical arguments’), which target not only the Confucians’ ethical and political 
recommendations but their epistemology.  Here, I offer a reading of  such argumentation within 1
a possible broader conception of  their use: one where genealogy does not simply aim at 
subverting or vindicating one’s concepts, beliefs, or judgments, but aims at a ruler’s political-
epistemic flexibility and, consequently, the state’s adaptivity. Moreover, within such a conception, 
 For non-genealogical readings, see, e.g., Cook 2005, Harris 2013b, and Schneider 2013.1
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genealogical argumentation would not just be a philosophical method but a manifestation of  the 
state’s adaptivity. 
This reading of  the Han Feizi is mainly motivated by the “spectre of  self-defeat” Amia Srinivasan 
has observed to haunt critics using genealogical arguments (2015, 328): while such genealogists 
deploy arguments to undermine their interlocutor’s concepts, beliefs, or judgments by revealing 
that they are defeated by their formative contingencies, there remains the worry that the very 
arguments used rely on concepts, beliefs, or judgments are similarly vulnerable to contingencies. 
As Srinivasan observes, “[o]ur epistemological beliefs appear to depend on the contingencies of  
culture, history and evolution in much the same way as our moral, theological or metaphysical 
beliefs do” (2019, 134): e.g., Charles Mills has suggested that the belief  that external-world 
scepticism is a problem seems to be a “perk” for “those most solidly attached to the world [who] 
have the luxury of  doubting its reality”; “whereas those whose attachment is more precarious, 
whose existence is dependent on the goodwill or ill temper of  others, are those compelled to 
recognize that it exists” (1994, 8). If  this is similarly true for a genealogist’s premises, then their 
genealogy would have little purchase, since they “can offer [their] opponent little reason to 
accept [their] conclusion,” nor have they reason to accept it themselves (Srinivasan 2019, 134). 
To address this threat, I read Han Fei’s genealogical method alongside not materialist or 
historicist contemporaries (like Shen Dao or Xunzi; cf. Cook 2005, Harris 2016), but a 
Zhuangian tradition of  ethical self-cultivation through meditation.  That is, I trace Han Fei’s 2
genealogical mode of  argumentation to the Zhuangzi’s meditative practices, understanding his 
genealogy as a means to undo audience’s fixations on existing political frameworks, to bring 
about a state more flexible, responsive, and adaptive to its circumstances—a process resonating 
with the ethical self-constitution of  the Zhuangian adept. 
Admittedly, scholars tend to avoid drawing connections between the Zhuangzi and Han Feizi, 
especially since it is impossible to tell how much Han Fei would have been familiar with our 
current version of  the Zhuangzi (cf. Sato 2013).  In contrast, the Han Feizi contains explicit 3
commentaries on the Daodejing (see, e.g., T. H. Kim 2010, Queen 2013): the chapter “Explaining 
Laozi” even begins with an interpretation of  an explicit genealogy of  virtue from the Daodejing 
(cf. Ci 2011). Still, I submit that a Zhuangian approach importantly illuminates an under-
appreciated dimension of  genealogy. My goals here are philosophical: this is less a historical 
genealogy than an imaginary philosophical genealogy of  Han Fei’s own use of  genealogy, 
identifying a possible route he could have taken to avoid self-defeat, rather than what he 
necessarily thought about a problem not explicitly thematised in the text (cf. Williams 2002). 
With this, I hope to also take the first steps towards a “Zhuangist-[Legalist] synthesis” Tao Jiang 
suggests could provide us with an alternative political imaginary outside of  the Confucian-
dominated discourse of  contemporary Chinese political philosophy (2021, 474; cf. Bai 2014). As 
he observes, this “is a path that was not taken in Chinese political history [especially given Han 
Fei’s notoriety as the philosophical progenitor of  a millennia-long imperial bureaucracy], but 
there is no intrinsic reason for us not to contemplate such an intriguing possibility under a 
drastically different context in the contemporary world” (ibid., 475). 
 Translations used for the Zhuangzi and Han Feizi are Ziporyn 2020 and Watson 2003 (or Liao 1959a/b where 2
relevant).
 Han Fei might have encountered some Zhuangian ideas via the Jixia Academy (e.g., Sato 2013), but not the 3
entire Zhuangzi. Zhuangzi authorship is composite, with later authors possibly contemporaneous with Han Fei 
(Liu 2015a). The reading of the Zhuangzi here draws on Inner and Miscellaneous Chapters, and might be 
understood as how later Zhuangists of the latter reflected on language use in the former.
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I 
I have argued elsewhere (2022), following Srinivasan (2015), that an Argument from Unreliability 
(AU), is foundational to a number of  Han Fei’s criticisms of  the Confucians in “Five Vermin” 
and “Eminence in Learning.”  AU relies on what epistemologists call the safety condition on 4
knowledge: a genealogy of  S’s judgment that p would show that S’s judgment is unsafe (and 
hence unreliable), where, in using a sufficiently similar method, S would have judged that p, 
where p is false.  Han Fei uses a version of  AU against the judgments of  the Confucians, central 5
to which are the models of  sage kings as bases for political judgment and action. Confucians are 
generally thought to advocate using the sage kings and their actions as models for making 
judgment in their virtue politics, as an extension of  their virtue ethics (Tan 2005, Hutton 2008, S. 
Kim 2012, Harris 2019): if  S or S’s action resembles the models of  the sage kings, S or S’s action 
is ethically and politically choice-worthy.  This, for “the rulers of  [Han Fei’s] time,” meant 6
regarding eloquent men of  learning who “study rhetoric” as worthy and to honour them as the 
sage kings did (Watson 2003, 123). 
Arguing against the judgments of  Confucians and Confucian-sympathetic rulers that eloquence 
and honouring it are politically choice-worthy, Han Fei appeals to the historic failures of  their 
epistemic method when used by Confucius (who by this time was a model himself) to 
demonstrate the method’s unreliability: even as an ideal epistemic agent, Confucius’ judging of  
his disciple Cai Yu according to the latter’s eloquence led him to believe that Cai Yu would be 
virtuous (or at least have potential for virtue), but Cai Yu is later cited as why Confucius loses 
confidence in such judgments (Watson 2003, 124; Analects 5.10). By highlighting that the 
Confucians’ method of  using the sage kings as models for judgments had admittedly failed even 
their own founding figure, Han Fei concludes that their judgments are unsafe—and hence 
unreliable (Wilson 2022). 
However, plausibly, a Confucian would deny that judging according to the models of  the sage 
kings is ‘sufficiently similar’ to judging according to eloquence—rather, the latter would have 
been abandoned by Confucius for that very reason in his own process of  virtue-cultivation. This 
claim of  dissimilarity would based on how eloquence is simply irrelevant when judging according 
to the models of  the sage kings: it is about resemblances of  dispositions and actions, not 
eloquence (Hutton 2008). Thus, Confucius’ failure would not count as evidence of  a lack of  
safety in the method of  using the models of  the sage kings. Yet, for Han Fei, this claim would 
itself  constitute evidence of  the epistemic method’s problem: it fails to realise that, just as 
eloquence (which is itself  a semblance of  wisdom) do not suffice for judgments of  virtue, the 
resemblances of  actions to the models of  the sage kings do not suffice for judgments of  political 
virtue. Still, to support this, he would have to appeal to reasons external to an epistemology 
based on the models of  the sage kings. Each would thereby be begging the question against the 
other as to what determines sufficient similarity in epistemic methods, since they would be using 
their own epistemic methods for this.  Han Fei’s AU thus does not independently seem to be 7
able to provide reasons for a Confucian to abandon using the models of  the sage kings internal to 
their political epistemology. Admittedly, reasons eschewing the models of  the sage kings might 
be amenable to some Confucians, for whom the models of  the sage kings, while central, are less 
 Srinivasan’s (2015) taxonomy includes five kinds of genealogical arguments (see Wilson 2022 for Han Fei’s 4
use).
 Safety may be formulated as: “S knows p only if S could not have easily falsely believed p using a sufficiently 5
similar method to the one she actually uses to form her belief that p” (Srinivasan 2015, 339; cf. Sosa 1999).
 For a reading of Confucian ethics and politics as discontinuous, see El Amine 2015; for a non-virtue-ethical 6
reading of Confucian ethics, see Lee 2013.
 Srinivasan observes a similar impasse between AU-genealogists and internalists or defeatist externalists (2015, 7
341–2).
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epistemically foundational (e.g., Xunzi; Cua 2000, Harris 2013a), but they would not be 
amenable, at least, to Confucians exclusively committed to virtue politics. 
Self-defeat is also pertinent for Han Fei, given that his positive programme involves a method of  
model-based judgments too. For him and his ruler, correct judgments involve models [fa, also: 
‘laws’],  according to which the ruler would “govern the state, disposing of  all matters on their 8
basis alone,” using them “to rectify the mind [of  subordinates]” (Watson 2003, 28; Liao 1959a, 
271). These models dictate correspondences between official titles and speeches (which would 
include Han Fei’s own), and performances and affairs: political judgment thereby involves 
determining whether pairings of  official titles and speeches with affairs and performances accord 
with the appropriate models. While the Confucians rely on the sage kings for their models, Han 
Fei’s ruler is meant to establish these models themselves. There thus needs to be a way to ensure 
his and his ruler’s judgments are not similarly susceptible to AU, if  they are to at least qualify as 
alternatives: i.e., for AU to be successful, the Confucian interlocutor requires reasons for why 
judging on the basis of  semblances to ruler-generated models is not sufficiently similar to 
judging on the basis of  semblances to the models of  the sage kings—especially since Han Fei’s 
method is meant also for rulers of  “mediocre judgment” (Watson 2003, 125). 
On occasions where he explicitly considers the grounds of  the ruler’s models, like in the chapters 
“The Principle Features of  Legalism” or “Explaining Laozi,” Han Fei contrasts judging 
according to their private wisdom with judging according to the patterns of  the Dao—i.e., the 
natural course of  things (Harris 2011, Hendrischke 2018).  “The Way [dao] of  the Ruler” opens 9
with the following passage: 
The [Dao] is the beginning of  all beings and the measure of  right and wrong. Therefore 
the enlightened ruler holds fast to the beginning in order to understand the 
wellspring of  all beings, and minds the measure in order to know the source of  good 
and bad. He waits, empty and still, letting names define themselves and affairs reach their own 
settlement. Being empty, he can comprehend the true aspect of  fullness; being still, he 
can correct the mover. Those whose duty it is to speak will come forward to name 
themselves; those whose duty it is to act will produce results. When names and results 
match, the ruler need do nothing more and the true aspect of  all things will be revealed. (Watson 
2003, 15) [emphases mine] 
That is, the ruler’s fa for judgment is to be naturalistically grounded in how ‘names define 
themselves and affairs reach their own settlement,’ when the ruler attends to them appropriately 
(Harris 2011, Yang 2012). Indeed, as materialist and historicist readings of  the Han Feizi 
emphasise, the text is replete with empirical arguments relying on claims about human 
motivation and ethology, consistently appealing to its audience to attend to natural facts and 
historical circumstances in making political judgments (Flanagan and Hu 2011, Harris 2013b). In 
the chapter “Criticisms of  the Ancients, Series One,” Han Fei also engages in a conceptual 
analysis of  the purported perfect efficacy of  the sage kings: if  Emperor Yao had indeed been 
maximally efficacious, there would have been no opportunity for the succeeding Emperor Shun 
to have been the same—thus, to hold them both as efficacious would be contradictory. Such 
variegated argumentation is consistent with Han Fei’s own recommendation to “know the mind 
of  the person one is trying to persuade and to be able to fit one’s words to it” (Watson 2003, 74). 
 Whether ‘fa’ changed its meaning to only refer to penal codes is disputed, but this does not affect its epistemic 8
role in judgment (Hansen 1994, Tan 2011).
 ‘Dao’ in pre-Qin texts admits several meanings: ‘a physical course or path,’ ‘a course of things and affairs,’ ‘the 9
proper course of things and affairs,’ ‘an account of the (proper) course of things and affairs,’ and ‘the course of 
the natural or cosmic order.’ For a cosmological reading of ‘Dao’ in the Han Feizi, see, e.g., Song 2010.
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That said, Han Fei leaves largely unarticulated the grounds for how his own epistemic method is 
able to avoid the contingencies undermining his opponents’—being more preoccupied with 
arguing for the fact that it does or would (Harris 2013b, Schneider 2013, Martinich 2014). And 
while Han Fei’s genealogical arguments might not be meant to independently provide positive 
support for his own political programme, for them to successfully critique Confucians (or 
Confucian-sympathetic rulers) in the first place, the arguments should rely on premises 
acceptable to Confucians. The problem with AU is not whether there are mind-independent 
truths or whether his judgments resulting from attending to the natural world are true or more 
factually accurate than the Confucians’, but more fundamentally “how to individuate belief-forming 
methods for the purposes of  assessing their safety [emphasis mine],” while “[a]ny judgment about 
what counts as a distinct or superior method will have to be informed, in a circular fashion,” 
since individuation of  epistemic methods will have to rely on first-order judgments (Srinivasan 
2019, 133–134). We observe subversive and vindicatory genealogies also in contemporaneous 
texts like the Mozi, Daodejing, and Xunzi, providing diverging genealogies to diverging political-
epistemic ends, with many—if  not all—also laying claim to be based on how ‘things naturally 
are’ (Cua 2000, Ci 2011, Fraser 2015). This is thus not a mere disagreement about what the 
natural facts are, but a disagreement in what the epistemic method should be: it would be 
insufficient to simply appeal to empirical arguments and factual accuracy to bolster AU, since 
there are upstream disagreements in how one determines what count as evidence for assessing 
one’s own epistemic method. Therefore, for the Confucian, the method of  ‘letting names define 
themselves and affairs reach their own settlement’ as the basis of  judgment—underspecified as it 
is here—cannot ground AU. 
Some scholars suggest that Han Fei’s appeal to the Dao for normativity in judgment might be less 
of  a substantive philosophical commitment and more of  a matter of  extraneous contingencies 
of  textual composition or ministerial rhetoric (Goldin 2013, Pines 2013). However, as they also 
note, this may rather reflect a principled agnosticism about the possibility of  any privileged 
political epistemology or a matter of  Realpolitik. I submit that attending to the place of  
meditation in the Zhuangzi’s sceptical project and how it relates to the text’s communicative 
strategy allows us a possible way to understand Han Fei’s use of  genealogy along similar lines, 
and how these contingencies might actually address—rather than compound—the problem of  
self-defeat. 
II 
Self-defeat has also been observed to threaten sceptical arguments in the Zhuangzi (e.g., Kjellberg 
1994, Schwitzgebel 1996, Soles and Soles 1998). Here, I attend specifically to how a certain way 
of  understanding the Zhuangzi’s communicative strategy allows the text’s scepticism to avoid 
undermining its own recommended method.  10
Although the Zhuangzi has been aptly described as a “protean text,” especially given the plethora 
of  interpretations it inspires (Van Norden 1996, 247), it may nonetheless be generally 
characterised as deploying sceptical arguments to criticise the Confucians (and even other 
Daoists) for fixating on inflexible courses of  living (or daos) with “whatever completed form of  
our [heart]minds [xin] so far taken shape,” recommending instead a flexible and adaptive 
equilibrium amid the contingencies of  organic and social life (Ziporyn 2020, 13).  11
To appreciate how the Zhuangzi’s scepticism advances these criticisms, we should keep mind that 
judgments in Warring States texts were often understood to be of  a practical nature (Fraser 2013, 
 For its scepticism more generally, see, e.g., Kjellberg and Ivanhoe 1996, Hansen 2003, Cantor 2020.10
 Yet unexplored, some arguments in the Zhuangzi might also be read genealogically (e.g., the passage on 11
monism).
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Allen 2015), where judgments are made by the heartmind (the agent’s cognitive-affective centre). 
The Zhuangzi often targets a particular conception of  the connection between names [ming] and 
objects or practices in judgment: in the Confucian understanding of  the relationship between 
language, judgment, and ethics, the ideal Confucian agent (i.e., the gentleman [junzi]) is 
characterised by the expression of  dispositions to speak and act according to rectified [zheng] 
judgments appropriate to their roles and relationships (Loy 2020). The heartmind’s judgments of  
pairings between names and objects or practices are to be rectified according to the models of  
the sage kings, which are embodied as the virtues of  benevolence and righteousness and 
encoded in the Zhou Dynasty’s rituals and music.  12
The Zhuangzi’s undermining of  this Confucian framework targets at the fixity of  their system of  
judgments, especially as wedded to the ancient Zhou tradition. Such fixations, as the Zhuangzi 
repeatedly emphasises, lead to the organism’s early demise. Instead, the Zhuangian adept would 
go beyond “[halting] at whatever verifies [the heartmind’s] preconceptions” (in the same way one 
would match a tally with its pair), to become receptive to the myriad things in the world and the 
(natural or cosmological) Dao: inhabiting an equilibrium state which “[responds] to all the endless 
things [one] confronts, thwarted by none”—i.e., to respond appropriately to the contingencies 
of  its environment (Ziporyn 2020, 15). For example, the chapter “In the Human World” begins 
with a parodic account of  Confucius repeatedly telling his disciple Yan Hui that the latter’s 
various proposals to aid the state of  Wei by applying Confucian standards would lead to not only 
failure, but that Yan Hui “will most likely go and get [him]self  executed” (ibid., 34). Instead, 
Confucius recommends Yan Hui to go beyond even apparent sensory distinctions, to ‘fast his 
heartmind [xinzhai],’ restraining its operations, so that his mind would “[go] no further than 
meshing there like a tally” and to cultivate “a waiting for the presence of  whatever thing may 
come” (ibid.). 
One way to frame the importance of  heartmind-fasting for achieving and maintaining one’s 
equilibrium state is with Chris Fraser’s Foucauldian framework for the Zhuangian subject’s 
ethical self-constitution (Fraser 2014, cf. Foucault 1983). This involves four aspects: the ethical 
substance, or that which is cultivated; the mode of  subjection, or why the agent should engage in the 
cultivation; the telos, or the goal of  such cultivation; and the ethical work, or the means whereby 
the agent cultivates themselves. The ethical substance is the heartmind, whose operational 
importance was mentioned earlier. The mode of  subjection is “nourishing life” [yangsheng] or 
“fully living out one’s years” [qiongnian]—i.e., the organism’s longevity or full lifespan (Fried 2007, 
Sikri 2021). The telos is an existential wandering [you], or as Fraser puts it, “a second-order dao 
[here: ‘system of  (action-guiding) judgments’] by which we explore the various first-order dao 
open to us—a meta-dao of  recognizing and taking up potential paths presented by the interaction 
between agents’ personal capacities and motivation and their objective circumstances [italics 
added]” (Fraser 2014, 200). Such you does not lead to an emphasis on an impersonal relation to 
one’s environment and outright denial of  existing daos, but an ecological relation and a pluralism that 
draws on the various available daos for whichever might conduce the organism’s longevity (cf. 
Saunders 2020). Being fixated on a first-order dao would, conversely, be maladaptive for the 
human organism, preventing it from adapting to subsequent changes in the demands of  its 
circumstances—i.e., such a fixation would constitute a pathology for the organism, which would 
thereby live a suboptimal life (cf. Sikri 2021). 
Lastly, the ethical work, or practice whereby the Zhuangian agent becomes an ethical adept, is 
heartmind-fasting, expressed in the Zhuangian meditative practice of  sitting-and-forgetting 
[zuowang] (cf. Wang 2021).  This are found in the aforementioned “In the Human World” 13
passage, as a cure for Yan Hui’s eagerness, as well as a passage from “The Great Source as 
 i.e., to “rectify names [zhengming]” (Analects 13.3, Loy 2020).12
 Shang 2006 briefly compares forgetting in the Zhuangzi and Nietzsche.13
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Teacher,” wherein Yan Hui is seen to surpass Confucius by simply ‘sitting and forgetting.’  The 14
ethical work in these passages, taken together, are understood as explicitly anti-Confucian, 
involving a linear progression of  forgetting and fasting: to first “forget benevolence and 
righteousness” (the Confucian virtues or dispositions), then to forget rites and music (the 
Confucian archive of  judgments), and lastly to forget one’s “limbs and body,” “perception and 
intellect,” and “form and understanding” (Ziporyn 2020, 62); Yan Hui thereby arrives at a 
oneness with the Datong, which is simply a state of  “non-obstruction” (Hong 2013, 287; cf. 
Slingerland 2013). That is, in Zhuangian meditation, one withholds any privileged tallying and 
organisation of  actions or judgments, withholding even the assumption of  the human body and 
its corresponding cognitive-affective structuring of  sensory inputs. This results in the 
equilibrium state of  receptivity denoted as ‘being empty’ or ‘emptiness,’ which facilitates you 
(Fraser 2014). 
But how might the Zhuangzi itself  circumvent its own critique from contingency and how should 
one articulate (even reason about) this meditative process, given that one should ‘forget’ the tally-
matching that constitutes language, as well as ‘form and understanding’? And how is Yan Hui 
able to articulate his method of  sitting-and-forgetting to himself  and Confucius in the 
aforementioned passages? Attending precisely to the seeming paradoxical nature of  this linguistic 
task is key, since, as many have observed, the Zhuangzi’s scepticism is intimately connected with 
its communicative strategy (Schwitzgebel 1996, Berthel 2015). 
The passage concluding “External Things” refers to using language in a manner akin to using “a 
fish trap” or rabbit snare—i.e., discarded after use—but ends with the paradoxical question, 
“Where can I find a man who has forgotten words [得忘⾔ dewangyan], so I can have a word with 
him?” (Ziporyn 2020, 224). The translated participle ‘forgotten’ here is often read by anglophone 
scholars in the present perfect tense, with the author wanting to have a word with a person who 
has performed the forgetting of  words (e.g., Soles and Soles 1998, Wang 2003).  However, the 15
(original) text allows—or invites us to—a more substantive rereading wherein ‘forgotten words’ 
is instead a compound noun, with the author wanting to have a word with a person who has 
acquired the objects that are forgotten-words. This is supported by the passage’s textual parallels 
of  having acquired fish [得⿂ deyu], rabbits [得兔 detu], and meaning [得意 desi]. The key, 
therefore, is not in the contradiction of  using words when one has gotten rid of  them, but in the 
nature of  the words being used. 
But how exactly do ‘forgotten-words’ function to avoid being privileged by the meditator while 
facilitating the ethical work? An answer is found immediately in the subsequent chapter, “Words 
Lodged Elsewhere” (as well as “The Whole World”), which characterises the Zhuangzi’s author as 
using words or speech [yan] that are ‘tipping-vessel’ words [zhiyan], which manifest “as coming 
from the mouths of  other people [yuyan]” or “as citations from weighty authorities [zhongyan]” 
(Ziporyn 2020, 225). The late Ming commentator Wang Fuzhi understood these “three modes 
of  speech [sanyan]” collectively to distinguish the Zhuangzi’s communicative strategy from the 
“rectified discourse [zhenglun]” of  other Warring States texts (Wang 1976, 246; cf. Morrow 2016). 
Scholars have since also characterised zhiyan as an adaptive form of  language that allows the text 
to circumvent its attacks on the Confucians’ understanding of  language and self-cultivation (e.g., 
Wang 2003, Chiu 2015). This follows from the Zhuangzi’s editor Guo Xiang’s allusion to a goblet 
[zhi] that tips itself  over when filled, zhiyan is meant to take upon itself  meanings that it then 
divests once circumstances are no longer appropriate for such meanings. Interpretations of  
zhiyan have thus tended to converge on the idea that a user of  zhiyan would not purport 
 cf. Analects 15.5’s description of Shun as “[achieving] order” by simply “hold[ing] [zheng] himself in a respectful 14
posture [on his royal seat]” (Raphals 2014).
 Victor Mair renders this as “a person who knows how to forget about words” (Mair 1994, 277)15
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privileged semantic and epistemic standing in any context, manifesting only in the vernacular of  
its interlocutors and borrowing epistemic authority from their authoritative figures. Here, this 
would mean that the passages on meditative practice, involving the revered figure of  Confucius, 
should be read as a specifically anti-Confucian undertaking instead of  a general recommendation: 
just like Yan Hui, the meditation passages’ intended audience are meant to be Confucian, or at 
least Confucian-sympathetic. After all, such a criticism would not resonate with someone with 
the Daodejing’s epistemological outlook, which also recommends emptiness and simplicity as a 
desired state (Moeller and D’Ambrosio 2017, Suzuki 2021). 
Further, as Daniel Fried and Wim de Reu argue, zhiyan should be also understood as more than 
just a negative rhetorical strategy (Fried 2007, de Reu 2017). Zhiyan is also meant to positively 
express and communicate the same flexibility which the text recommends for securing one’s 
longevity. Drawing on the archaeological recovery of  a neolithic Yangshao ceramic irrigation 
vessel and the agricultural metaphors in the zhiyan passages, Fried observes that such vessels [zhi] 
are the better reference for the Zhuangzi’s ‘zhiyan’: vessels which tip over not just when filled, but 
also for the sake of  facilitating the organic cycles of  nature, ensuring that cultivated crops would 
not die prematurely. This irrigational cycle is understood as a mirroring of  how the 
meteorological cycles facilitate harmonious organic life on the terrestrial plane. 
Fried and de Reu highlight how zhiyan passages explicitly echo the Monkey Keeper passage in the 
chapter “Equalizing Assessment of  Things,” wherein a monkey keeper displays sage-like 
flexibility in speaking to his monkeys, switching their feeding regime from three chestnuts in the 
morning and four in the evening to the opposite to appease them (though the change is 
ultimately arbitrary), inasmuch as this facilitates harmonious existences between the organisms. 
Conversely, Yan Hui’s initial fixation on the Confucian dao would have neither helped himself  
nor the state of  Wei. Zhiyan, in manifesting as ‘coming from the mouths of  others’ and ‘citations 
from weighty authorities,’ should thus be understood not only in terms of  the forgotten-words 
whereby one reasons and communicates under the threat of  sceptical self-defeat, but also the 
means whereby the user is able to avoid conflict and live out their years—i.e., the mode of  
subjection of  ethical self-cultivation (cf. Moeller and D’Ambrosio 2017). 
Thus, what normatively grounds the meditative method of  sitting-and-forgetting in the Zhuangzi 
is not an epistemological commitment but a critical orientation to removing blockages in order to 
living out the fullness of  the particular organism’s lifespan in its environment (Wenning 2011, cf. 
Jaeggi 2018): in the case of  Yan Hui, the removal of  Confucian maladaptations of  the natural 
human dao (or the Dao itself, understanding the human being more ecologically) that were 
brought about by his fixation on such an insufficiently flexible system of  judgments. The text’s 
account of  Yan Hui’s ethical work, put forward as a meditative method, is thus itself  an instance 
of  zhiyan, borrowing from the Confucian dao to articulate itself  and thus does not fixate on the 
judgments given in that dao. Moreover, sitting-and-forgetting, as in the case of  Yan Hui, is meant 
to ensure his longevity, by preventing him from acting on the basis of  maladapted models, as 
well as to invite Confucius to use it to free himself  too from fixation. Turning to the text’s own 
communicative strategy, the reversal of  roles of  master and disciple between Confucius and Yan 
Hui could be read in the same way the Monkey Keeper switches feeding regimes: the Zhuangzi 
itself  does not ultimately adhere to a particular tallying of  ‘Yan Hui’ with ‘disciple’ and 
‘Confucius’ with ‘master,’ nor does it necessarily uphold Yan Hui as the master and Confucius as 
the disciple. What is crucial is simply that meditation is recommended to Yan Hui, Confucius, and 
the Confucian-sympathetic reader, and not others, to undo their fixations on the Confucian dao. 
Thus, Zhuangian meditation itself  constitutes an instance of  zhiyan, avoiding sceptical self-
defeat, inasmuch as self-defeat assumes a privileged epistemic stance from which it abstains 
(Schwitzgebel 1996, Williams 2017). 
III 
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Before proceeding to consider how Han Fei’s genealogy might parallel Zhuangian meditation, it 
is worth underscoring his political reinterpretation of  judgments (cf. Hansen 2000, Sun 2015). 
First, Han Fei’s own use and discussion of  judgments and models turn away from the focus on 
the epistemic agent qua ethical agent (as in the Zhuangzi), instead circumscribing the epistemic 
agent for the most part within the context of  the relationship between the ruler and their court 
officials. Han Fei’s aforementioned focus on officials’ titles and speeches, and their affairs and 
performances restricts political judgment to context of  statecraft. This restriction would extend 
as far as him claiming that while “the best thing is to practice benevolence and righteousness and 
cultivate the literary arts,” such a person “who has performed no meritorious service to the 
nation” or “who holds no government title” should not be in government (Watson 107–108; 
Bárcenas 2013). 
Han Fei’s political interpretation of  judgments can thus be read as going beyond the Zhuangzi’s 
organic distinctions: the ruler is to concern themselves exclusively with distinctions at the state 
level, disregarding the cognitive-affective makeup of  individuals except as it pertains to statecraft 
(Jiang 2021). As Albert Galvany has argued, Han Fei’s emphasis on the longevity of  the state 
nevertheless assumes malleability in human behaviour at the individual level (like the Zhuangzi), 
albeit drawn upon to justify the imposition of  laws by the ruler—where the individual’s longevity 
is predicated on the state’s longevity (Galvany 2013, cf. Bárcenas 2013).  Han Fei would even 16
put forward that “to scheme definitely for the advantages of  unifying the people, is an act of  
benevolence and wisdom” (Liao 1959b, 242). Models thus become regulations specifying 
uniform behavioural norms backed by promises or threats of  clearly defined rewards or 
punishments, indiscriminate across ranks (i.e., law). 
We may see the ruler’s function parallel the heartmind’s, when we consider the relationship 
between the ruler’s administrative technique [shu], involving the setting up of  clear models and 
enforcing them through a strict reward-punishment system, and ministerial persuasion, involving 
the officials attempting to “fit their words” to the “[heart]mind of  the person one is trying to 
persuade” (Watson 2003, 73). The heartmind makes judgments on whether given name-object 
pairings conform to its models just as the ruler makes decisions on whether given speech-
performance pairing conform to their models. Meanwhile, operationally, the faculties [guan] 
collectively offer pairings that aim to conform to the pairings sought by the heartmind, whether 
or not the model conduces the organism’s longevity. Similarly, officials [guan] are to provide 
pairings that aim to conform to the pairing sought by the ruler, whether or not the model 
conduces the state’s longevity (Hunter 2013).  17
Applying Fraser’s framework of  self-cultivation to Han Fei’s thought, we can speak of  four 
aspects of  politics in appreciating the importance of  genealogy for the achieving and 
maintaining the state’s equilibrium. The political substance, or the object of  political work, would be 
the ruler, whose operational importance we have seen to involve the making of  judgments on the 
basis of  how the titles and speeches of  officials relate to their performances. The mode of  
subjection, or why the state should engage in the political work, would be the state’s longevity, 
which would “increase the means of  [the people’s] livelihood” (Watson 2003, 129). 
The telos of  political work would be a second-order, dynamic configuration wherein the ruler 
explores the various first-order configurations of  systems of  models open to him—recognising 
and taking up potential paths presented by the interaction between the ruler, his court officials, 
 Some emphasise the constancy of Han Fei’s conception of human motivation, according to which the reward-16
punishment system operates (e.g., Flanagan and Hu 2011, Harris 2013b, Jiang 2021). These are not mutually 
exclusive, since one may behave in different ways with the same basic motivation.
 Xunzi (traditionally Han Fei’s teacher, cf. Sato 2013) explicitly makes this comparison (Hutton 2014, 17.50–59).17
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their motivations, as well as their social and material circumstances and the state’s more generally. 
Without fixations on first-order systems, the ruler’s heartmind would remain indeterminate, so 
the court officials would not be able to present their own tallying of  their titles & speeches with 
their performances & affairs to curry favour or accumulate power for themselves. We can thus 
see why Han Fei might denote the ruler’s own equilibrium state of  indeterminacy as ‘being 
empty’ or one of  emptiness (as we saw in I), facilitating flexibility in the systems of  laws.  18
Under this picture, the ruler’s equilibrium would entail the state’s equilibrium. This is because a 
lack of  emptiness would result in a twofold problem for the state’s equilibrium: first, the ruler’s 
thoughts would be discernible by their court officials, resulting in the state’s internal 
disequilibrium through officials gaining ascendency over them (just as ill-disciplined sense 
faculties might gain ascendency over the heartmind); second, the laws issued and maintained by 
the ruler would be insufficiently responsive to the demands of  the state’s military and material 
circumstances (since they would not be receiving accurate information from their officials), 
resulting in the state’s external disequilibrium. We can now also better appreciate why Han Fei 
regarded Confucians as one of  the titular “Five Vermin” (Watson 2013, 117–118): these groups 
of  people were pathologies of  political life, preventing the state from reaching an adaptive 
equilibrium appropriate to its material and inter-state environment. 
Lastly, political work: just as meditation aims at undoing a Confucian-sympathetic individual’s 
fixation on particular virtues, codified distinctions, and physiological structures, genealogy would 
involve the undoing of  a Confucian-sympathetic ruler’s fixations on particular political virtues, 
systems of  models, and bureaucratic organisations. 
With this, we can finally turn to how Han Fei’s genealogy, when seen as structurally similar to 
Zhuangian meditation, could avoid self-defeat. The difficulty of  self-defeat, similar to what we 
saw for the Zhuangzi, was to find a way for Han Fei’s criticisms of  the Confucians—as 
extraneous to, and encroaching on, the ruler’s own natural and appropriate judgment—not to 
beg the question against them, and for his own models not to be similarly problematic. In 
response, we can now understand Han Fei as putting forth his argument in a persuasive mode 
structurally parallel to Zhuangian zhiyan: he need not purport privileged epistemic standing 
himself  in genealogical criticism but merely draw on ‘words coming from the mouth of  others’ 
or the words of  those regarded by the criticised as ‘weighty ancient authorities’ to dislodge the 
criticised’s fixation on the models of  the sage kings. Indeed, this is congruent with his ministerial 
advice to fit one’s words to the mind of  the person one is trying to persuade. 
So just as the Zhuangian agent undertakes any method suitable to their present constitution and 
environment to rid oneself  of  the pathology of  fixations on first-order daos, the Han Feizian 
ruler is to undertake any method suitable to their present constitution and environment to rid 
themselves from the pathology of  fixating on any privileged tallying and organisation of  court 
officials’ titles & speeches with their performances & affairs—undoing fixations on any given 
bureaucratic organisation the ruler might inherit and its corollary epistemic and incentive 
structures, whether Confucian, Mohist, or even Legalist. Han Fei himself  admits at points in the 
text (e.g., in “Five Vermin”) that Confucian daos could at some point have been an appropriate 
adaptation of  the state, but are nevertheless inappropriate as fixed configurations of  the state 
(Hutton 2008, Wilson 2022). The genealogical method thus constitutes one such means whereby 
a ruler, otherwise fixated on the model of  the sage kings, might undertake to arrive at emptiness. 
We can see that the invocation of  historical examples and figures would be in the vernacular of  
his interlocutors—including Confucian officials and rulers—and this would explain why the 
aforementioned, specifically anti-Confucian passage from “Eminence in Learning,” feature 
 Han Fei nevertheless cautions against a ‘will to emptiness’ in “Explaining Laozi,” paralleling the Zhuangzi 18
cautioning its readers against fixation on Laozian ideas (Moeller and D’Ambrosio 2017).
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genealogical argumentation that involve the sage kings as well as Confucius. Whereas in Han 
Fei’s critique of  Shen Dao, whose epistemic method he largely shared, while nevertheless also 
involving sage kings, invokes not genealogical arguments and the figure of  Confucius, but 
conceptual analyses—attending to the necessary and sufficient conditions of  political authority 
and the efficacy of  commands (Yang 2013, Harris 2016). 
Further, such an adaptive communicative strategy by an adviser would also be itself  an 
expression of  a state’s flexibility: Confucian-sympathetic rulers in power would not remove 
officials competent in ‘speaking their language,’ (as Han Fei argues in “Difficulties of  
Persuasion” and “Difficulties of  Speaking”), ensuring the state’s longevity in undoing its reliance 
on maladapted political frameworks (cf. Hunter 2013). We can thereby also understand how the 
setup of  constant second-guessing between the empty ruler and the persuading officials, which 
Han Fei describes as “persuasion [having] reached its fulfillment,” is ideal inasmuch as it 
introduces a dynamic epistemological equilibrium into state bureaucracy (Watson 2003, 77). 
Genealogical argumentation, then, can be understood as an instance of  ministerial persuasion 
whereby the state may become and remain receptive to the contingencies of  statecraft, avoiding 
self-defeat—inasmuch as self-defeat assumes a privileged epistemic stance the official ought to 
eschew, to ensure that the ruler’s system of  laws remains dynamic and responsive to the demands 
of  internal and external circumstances. 
And while the genealogist might not be able to offer arguments on grounds acceptable to either 
their interlocutor or themselves, the interlocutor nevertheless finds themselves on the defensive: 
even if  the Confucian does not accept Han Fei’s epistemological assumptions in AU, they can 
still at best beg the question against him. As Srinivasan puts it, the genealogist “exercises a kind 
of  meta-epistemic power: a power to reveal what we tacitly presume about ourselves in so far as 
we believe that our genealogically contingent beliefs are in fact knowledge” (Srinivasan 2019, 
135).  Even without accepting AU, Confucian epistemology nevertheless remains threatened by 19
the lack of  epistemic stability in their models of  judgment—while this instability would actually 
be a feature of  Han Fei’s dynamic and responsive epistemic method. This is not to say that 
model-use or administrative techniques (like the strict reward-punishment system) of  Han Fei’s 
ruler are dispensable in this dynamism (cf. Harris 2013a); rather, just as with the Zhuangian 
adept, it is the epistemic models’ content and grounds that adapt. 
IV 
I argued in this paper that Han Fei’s use of  genealogy can be seen as both a form of  persuasion 
for officials and a form of  ‘meditative’ exercise for the state with a Confucian or Confucian-
sympathetic ruler, to undo fixations on the models of  the sage kings and develop models that are 
flexible and responsive to the internal and external demands of  statecraft. Just as the Zhuangzi’s 
meditative method avoids self-defeat as an instance of  zhiyan, Han Fei’s genealogical method 
would avoid self-defeat if  understood as an instance of  critically-oriented ministerial persuasion, 
with premises to which he need not be epistemologically committed. Admittedly, while my 
reading might not be what Han Feizi himself  actually intended, I hope to have shown not only a 
different way of  conceptualising the genealogical method from the extant anglophone canon, 
but also a preliminary Zhuangist-Legalist political epistemology that may loosen contemporary 
Chinese political philosophy’s fixation on Confucianism. 
 Srinivasan denotes the worry that they might not be knowledge as “genealogical anxiety” (2019, 128).19
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